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SECURITIES LITIGATION IN THE ROBERTS COURT: 
AN EARLY ASSESSMENT 
 
John C. Coates IV
*
 
 
First Draft:  March 11, 2014 
Revised Draft:  July 21, 2014 
 
Ten years ago, as the Rehnquist Court was coming to a close, Professors Thomas 
Sullivan and Robert Thompson (S&T) showed
1
 that “private law” cases – by which they 
meant securities and antitrust – had plummeted in importance in the Supreme Court from 
an earlier heyday, and had cycled through decisions that first expanded, then contracted, 
and finally preserved the status quo in the reach of those laws.  Their work was useful as 
description – in giving an overview and assessment of cases in their study – and as 
explanation – offering a more complex analysis than the standard, simplistic, attitudinal 
model that political scientists use to reduce law to partisan affiliations.
2
  By showing that 
the decline in caseload and inflection points in the case outcome cycle coincided with the 
presence of Justice Lewis Powell, S&T provided persuasive evidence that Powell played 
an important business-oriented entrepreneurial role in shaping the Court’s docket and 
decisions – a role related to ideology, but one that distinguished him from other 
Republican appointees. In so doing, S&T improved our understanding of patterns in the 
mix and outcomes of Supreme Court cases from those predicated by simple counts of 
Republican and Democratic appointees. 
 
This article updates S&T with a preliminary assessment of the Roberts Court’s 
securities law decisions (along with some comparative data on antitrust cases and a 
broader set of “economic” cases), through the date of this writing.  One finding is that 
securities and antitrust cases represent a larger share of the Roberts Court’s docket than 
under Rehnquist, but only because its docket is substantially smaller than that of prior 
Courts (as others have explored
3
).  The absolute number of securities law cases per term 
has increased slightly, while the number of antitrust law cases has declined slightly, and 
                                                 
*   John F. Cogan Jr. Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School.  Thanks for helpful discussions 
but no blame for the contents of this paper should go to Ava Scheibler, ..., and to workshop participants at ... – all faults 
are mine.  Min Suk Choi, Casey Holzapfel, and Jason Wasser provided excellent research assistance.  For disclosure of 
financial interests potentially relevant to this article, see www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/COI/2012CoatesJohn.html. 
1 The Supreme Court and Private Law:  The Vanishing Importance of Securities and Antitrust, 53 Emory L.J. 
1571 (2004); see also A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities 
Laws, 52 Duke L.J. 841 (2003) (discussing cases between 1972 and 1987).  Their analysis updated a prior study by 
Alfred F. Conard, Securities Regulation in the Burger Court, 56 U. Col L. Rev. 183 (1985) (reporting on securities law 
cases through 1984). 
2 E.g., Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (2002); 
Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to 
Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1150, 1171-79 (2004); cf. H.W. Perry, Taking Political 
Science Seriously, 47 St. Louis U. L.J. 889, 891 (2003) (most political scientists would not believe that attitudes are the 
sole determinant, or that they play as singular a role as propounded by the so-called “attitudinal model”).  
3 E.g., Ryan J. Owens and David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court's Shrinking Docket, 53 Wm. & Mary 
L. Rev. 1219 (2012), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol53/iss4/4 (arguing that declining docket from 1940 to 
2008 is due to increased ideological polarization; the Congressional elimination of mandatory appellate jurisdiction in 
1988; and the presence of Justice White on the Court from 1962 to 1992, who made Circuit-conflict resolution a 
priority). 
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both types of cases continue to occupy a much smaller role (absolutely and relatively) 
than in pre-Rehnquist Courts.  Because the number of securities law decisions made by 
the Roberts Court is small (n=15), the remaining analysis necessarily remains conjectural.   
 
With that caveat, the Roberts Court to date has exhibited much less dissent in 
securities and antitrust law cases than prior Courts, or in its decisions in other issue areas, 
as measured both by minority votes and five-vote majorities.  Inconsistent with any 
sweeping view that the Roberts Court is “pro-business,” it continues to be significantly 
more “expansive” in securities law cases than in the “restrictive” Powell era. 4  
Quantitatively, 50% of the decisions expand the reach of the securities laws, slightly 
higher than the 47% under Rehnquist after Powell, versus the much lower 22% in the 
Powell era.  This mixed quantitative assessment is matched by a qualitative review of the 
cases, which are generally preservative and modest in their effects, whether expansive or 
restrictive.  This continuation of what one might call an inertial approach to the substance 
of securities law is partly attributable to the votes of Roberts himself, who has been the 
only Justice in the majority in every securities law decision in his time as Chief.
5
 
 
Where the Roberts Court has been restrictive, its decision are perhaps best 
understood as part of a broader retrenchment on procedure that has the effect of 
constraining federal court litigation in favor of business.
6
  At the same time, the Roberts 
Court has rejected bright-lines rules of substantive securities law that might have 
benefited managerial interests even more.
7
  This combination of proceduralism and a 
preference for standards over rules matches up well with the background of the Chief 
Justice as an appellate litigator and a member of the Judicial Conference’s Advisory 
Committee on Appellate Rules.  Appellate litigators are trained to not overreach – to 
shape arguments that focus on the case before them, to preserve discretion for judges, and 
to enhance the relative importance of litigation as a means of determining the law.  I 
would not be surprised if Chief Justice Roberts was sincere when he likened judges to 
“umpires” who “don't make the rules; they apply them. ... ”8  But those words come in the 
context of other words, less pithy but freighted with connotations – not of partisan 
ideology, but of legal ideology:  “Judges ... operate within a system of precedent, shaped 
by other judges ... and have to have the modesty to be open in the decisional process to 
the considered views of their colleagues on the bench,” yet a precedent “is not an 
inexorable command” and there are “circumstances under which you should revisit a 
prior precedent that you think may be flawed....”9  This is the ideology of the common 
law, not of a transactional lawyer looking for clear guidance in the form of bright-line 
rules, but of a litigator who is more comfortable with shifting standards of litigation and 
the nuances of procedure than with the substantive statutes and SEC regulations that 
constitute the bulk of securities law practice.  
                                                 
4 See note 25 infra on how cases were classified as “expansive” or “restrictive”. 
5 See Appendix I. 
6 See note 18 infra. 
7 These conclusions led the first draft of the article to conclude that it would have been surprising if Halliburton 
II had resulted in a bright-line rejection of the “fraud-on-the-market” presumption of reliance, and instead was likely to 
result in a more modest holding.  For a discussion of the actual holding, see text accompanying notes 41-54 infra. 
8 See http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/13/AR2005091300693.html. 
9 See http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/13/AR2005091301981.html. 
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Part I of this article provides a quantitative and qualitative overview of securities 
litigation in the Roberts Court, in absolute terms, and relative to other types of cases and 
relative to prior Courts.  Part II breaks down the cases on two dimensions – (a) 
procedural versus substantive, and (b) bright-lines versus standards – and shows that 
outcomes map reasonably well onto those dimensions, with expansive decisions being 
most common when lower courts had based restrictive decisions on bright-line, 
substantive decisional rules, and least common when lower courts had based restrictive 
decisions on procedural standards.  Part III (a) suggests the trends depicted in Parts I 
and II reflect the effects of having a Chief Justice who is a former appellate litigator and 
now a litigation entrepreneur leading a “procedural revolution” on a Court, (b) applies the 
analysis in the article to cases to be argued in the October 2014 term, and (c) sketches the 
types of cases likely to attract the Supreme Court’s attention in the future.  
 
The main take-away is that the Court can be expected to continue to have marginal 
and lottery-like effects on substantive securities law, particularly where it intersects with 
“growth areas” of doctrine, such as the ever-expanding modern First Amendment that 
produced Schwarzenegger,
10
 where the Court’s demand for a more carefully “tailored” 
regime of video game regulation reflected a blindness to basic facts of political economy, 
and Citizens United,
11
 where the Court’s reasoning reflected a similar blindness to basic 
facts of how public companies function and are regulated.  Where the Court may be 
expected to matter more systematically to business law generally and securities law in 
particular is in procedure – not only civil procedure, but also in responding to the D.C. 
Circuit’s interpretations and applications of the Administrative Procedure Act and other 
aspects of administrative law relevant to securities regulation.
12
 
                                                 
10 Also known as Brown v. EMA, 564 U.S. 08-1448 (2011) (striking down California ban on sale of violent video 
games to children). 
11 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
12 See John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation:  Case Studies and Implications, Yale 
L.J. (forthcoming 2014); John C. Coates IV, Towards Better Cost-Benefit Analysis:  An Essay On Regulatory 
Management, L. & Contemp. Probs. (forthcoming 2014). 
PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE – PLEASE DO NOT CIRCULATE 
 4 
Part I.  General Trends in Securities Law Cases in the Supreme Court 
 
This Part of the paper provides a quantitative and qualitative overview of securities 
litigation in the Roberts Court, in absolute terms, and relative to other types of cases and 
relative to prior Courts.   
 
A. Data and Coding 
 
To gather a comprehensive set of securities law cases under the Roberts Court, 
article collects cases coded as issue 80120 in the Supreme Court Database (SCD)
13
 for the 
terms 2005 to 2012 (n=11).  Cases decided after Roberts joined the Court for which 
certiorari was granted before he joined the Court are excluded – the goal is to contrast 
both case selection as well as outcomes.  SCOTUSblog
14
 was reviewed for cases pending 
in the 2013 term (n=3), and Westlaw was searched for additional securities law cases 
(n=1, Halliburton I,
15
 coded as 90110 in SCD, i.e., civil procedure).  The result is a 
dataset of fourteen securities law decisions from 2005 to 2013.  Halliburton II,
16
 argued 
in the 2013 term, was pending when this article was first drafted, but was decided on June 
23, 2014, adding a fifteenth case to the sample – or, if one wants to think of it this way, a 
“hold-out” sample of one, which is consistent with the analysis that follows.  These cases 
are listed in Appendix A.  These data were augmented with the full SCD for prior Courts, 
focusing on antitrust law cases (issues 80010 or 80020 in SCD) and economic issue cases 
(issue area 8 in SCD).
17
  
 
For each decision, the author and a research assistant separately read the opinion and 
independently applied the “expansive” and “restrictive” definitions used in S&T, 18 
resulting in the classifications in Appendix A.  In addition, each case was coded as 
“procedural” or “substantive” based on whether the decision turned primarily on an issue 
that is typically and primarily covered in a procedure course, as opposed to solely and 
primarily being taught in a substantive securities law course.  (Examples of “procedural” 
cases are discussed in Part I.C below.)  Finally, the cases were read to decide if the 
Supreme Court’s holding was, relative to the lower court holding, more of a “bright-line” 
rule or a “standard.”19  The coding of “expansive/restricted” resulted in 85% agreement, 
and the coding of “substantive/procedural” resulted in 93% agreement.  Cases where the 
coding differed were reread by each and discussed before a final code was assigned.   
 
One case (PCAOB
20
) was classified for “expansive/restrictive” purposes as “neutral,” 
                                                 
13 http://scdb.wustl.edu (last visited July 20, 2014). 
14 http://www.scotusblog.com (last visited July 20, 2014). 
15 Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 180 L. Ed. 2d 24 (2011). 
16 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., No. 13-317, 573 U. S. ____ (2014). 
17 Additional searches or recoding were not done – inconsistent with the construction of the Roberts Court 
dataset, but given the small numbers unlikely to bias the qualitative results in a meaningful way. 
18  As in S&T, supra note 1, “expansive” is defined to mean “broadening the reach of a securities law or 
regulation, or increasing the likelihood of liability,” “restrictive” is defined to mean “reducing the reach or decreasing 
the likelihood of liability,” and “neutral” is defined to mean neither expansive or restrictive. 
19 Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, 
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685 (1976). 
20 Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 177 L. Ed. 2d 
706 (2010) (holding for-cause removal provision unconstitutional). 
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since it upheld the Sarbanes-Oxley Act overall and generally upheld that statute’s scheme 
for the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), but did strike down one 
aspect of that scheme.  Troice presented the only other case that was not obviously 
expansive or restrictive – in the instant facts, the result of the decision was to treat the 
pending complaint as not precluded by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act 
of 1998 (SLUSA), and hence the complaint could proceed – an expansive result; but as 
discussed more below, the Court had to interpret the phrase “in connection with” 
narrowly, which could result (in future cases) in a more restrictive reach for the federal 
(as opposed to state) securities laws.  Nevertheless, for purposes of assessing the Roberts 
Court to date, the result of Troice was to expand the reach of securities litigation overall – 
and hence it is coded as “expansive” in the remaining analysis, although that choice does 
not materially affect the qualitative conclusions.   
 
The only case that was difficult to assess for the substantive/procedural coding was 
Morrison, which could be viewed in procedural terms (since it is essentially about what 
types of plaintiffs may bring cases) or substantive terms (since the Court held that the 
Second Circuit’s view of the case as raising jurisdictional questions was mistaken, and 
instead based its holding on a view of the substantive purposes of the securities laws).  
For purposes of the remaining analysis, Morrison is classified as procedural, for reasons 
discussed below. 
 
B. Quantitative Overview 
 
Analysis of the data set shows the following. 
 
a. Increase in Share of Securities Law Cases 
 
Table 1 presents the share of securities law, antitrust law, and economic issue cases 
under each of the Supreme Court Chief Justices since Chief Vinson.  It shows that 
securities law has experienced a resurgence in how large a share of the Roberts Court 
docket it represents compared to the Rehnquist Court – and, indeed, relative to any prior 
Court.  Just below two percent of the decisions on the Roberts Court have been devoted 
to securities law – more than antitrust law, and roughly 10% of the economic issue cases.  
Of course, two percent is still not a large share, and the total share of the docket devoted 
to “economic” issues (as coded by SCD) is not much higher than the Rehnquist Court, 
and well below that of the Vinson and Warren Courts.  Nevertheless, the resurgence in 
securities law might lead an observer to believe that the Roberts Court has returned to the 
securities law activity levels of the Powell era.  
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Table 1 Years 
Securities Law Cases as % of 
Total Supreme Court Docket 
Antitrust Law 
Cases as % of Total 
Economic Issue 
Cases as % of Total 
Vinson 
1946 to 
1952 
1.2% 4.6% 29% 
Warren 
1953 to 
1968 
0.5% 5.8% 25% 
Burger 
1969 to 
1985 
1.2% 2.8% 17% 
Rehnquist 
1986 to 
2004 
0.8% 1.2% 17% 
Roberts 
2005 to 
2013 
1.8% 1.5% 19% 
Total 
1946 to 
2013 
0.9% 3.3% 20% 
   
b. Decline in Overall Docket 
 
However, the increased share of securities law cases is due largely to the Court’s 
overall shrunken docket.  Table 2 presents the absolute numbers of cases under each of 
the Supreme Court Chief Justices since Chief Vinson, and of securities, antitrust and 
economic issue cases.  The total Roberts Court docket per year is half that of the Burger 
Court, and 30% smaller than the Rehnquist Court.  As a result, the absolute numbers of 
securities law cases per year have barely increased – from one per year under Rehnquist 
to 1.6 per year under Roberts – and remain well below that of the Burger Court.  
Economic issue cases generally, and antitrust law cases, are both down in absolute terms, 
from 1.5 and 22 per year under Rehnquist, to 1.3 and 16 per year under Roberts.  
 
Table 2 
Total 
Cases 
Cases 
Per 
Year 
Securities 
Law 
Cases 
Securities 
Law 
Cases Per 
Year 
Antitrust 
Law 
Cases 
Antitrust 
Law 
Cases 
Per Year 
Economic 
Issue 
Cases 
Economic 
Issue 
Cases Per 
Year 
Vinson 1011 144.4 12 1.7 47 6.7 292 41.7 
Warren 2643 165.2 12 0.8 152 9.5 648 40.5 
Burger 3234 190.2 38 2.2 90 5.3 562 33.1 
Rehnquist 2325 129.2 18 1.0 27 1.5 393 21.8 
Roberts 795 88.3 14 1.6 12 1.3 141 15.7 
Total 9941 148.4 90 1.3 328 4.9 2036 30.4 
 
Still, as also illustrated by Table 2, while the absolute numbers of securities law 
cases remain low, they have increased as a share of economic issue cases overall under 
the Robert Courts – from roughly 5% under Rehnquist to roughly 10% under Roberts.  
Thus, while both the overall docket and the economic issue docket have been shrinking, 
securities law has made up an increasing share of that smaller docket.   
 
c. Dissent and Polarization 
 
Has the degree of dissent or polarization increased under Chief Roberts, overall or in 
securities law?  The answer is “no,” as shown in Table 3.  If anything, securities law (and 
even more so, antitrust law) has seen a significant drop in the number of minority votes, 
and in the number of 5-vote majority decisions.  Under Chief Rehnquist, dissenting votes 
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in securities law cases represented 22% of total votes, and there were 5-vote majorities in 
seven (39%) securities law cases, including such cases as infamous Central Bank,
21
 
inscrutable Gustafson,
22
 and intricate Reves,
23
 among other cases.  Under Chief Roberts, 
there have been only 15% dissenting votes in securities law cases, and only three (20%) 
5-vote cases:  PCAOB, Stoneridge, and Janus.  This increase in harmony is also present 
in antitrust law cases under Chief Roberts, but not in economic issue cases beyond 
securities and antitrust law, where close votes have increased from 17% to 23%, and 
dissenting votes increased from 15% to 17%.   
 
Table 3 Securities 
Law Case 
Minority / 
All Votes 
5-Vote 
Majorities 
as % of 
Securities 
Law 
Cases 
Antitrust 
Law 
Case 
Minority 
/ All 
Votes 
5-Vote 
Majorities 
as % of 
Antitrust 
Law 
Cases 
Economic 
Issue Case 
Minority / 
All Votes 
5-Vote 
Majorities 
as % of 
Economic 
Issue 
Cases 
All Case 
Minority 
/ All 
Votes 
5-Vote 
Majorities 
as % of All 
Cases 
Vinson 8% 17% 19% 21% 20% 21% 20% 23% 
Warren 24% 50% 17% 22% 18% 18% 18% 28% 
Burger 15% 5% 19% 28% 16% 16% 19% 20% 
Rehnquist 22% 39% 20% 19% 15% 17% 20% 29% 
Roberts 15% 20% 9% 8% 17% 23% 20% 23% 
Total 16% 19% 19% 22% 17% 18% 19% 22% 
 
It is also worth noting here that, as discussed more below, the qualitative importance 
of the cases generating dissent under Chief Roberts is not high.  PCAOB had symbolic 
importance, but the outcome had little effect on the securities regulatory regime created 
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and while Stoneridge and Janus represented potentially 
important efforts by plaintiffs to maneuver around the equally divisive Central Bank and 
expand Rule 10b-5 cases to third parties, they did not substantially restrict securities law 
from where it had been prior to those decisions.  In contrast, the case most restricting the 
reach of securities law from the status quo ante was Morrison, which was a unanimous 
decision, as was the recently decided Halliburton II.   
 
d. No Overall Change in Restrictive Outcomes 
 
What about outcomes?  How if at all has the Roberts Court changed the way that 
securities law cases come out?  Table 4 breaks down case outcomes according to the 
“expansive” and “restrictive” classification scheme used in S&T, by era.24  As can be 
seen, the Roberts Court is characterized by neither the strongly expansive approach of the 
pre-Powell era, nor the strongly restrictive approach of the Powell era.  Instead, the 
Roberts Court is best characterized as merely continuing the balanced approach of the 
                                                 
21 Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
22 Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995) (holding that a “prospectus” as defined in the Securities Act of 
1933 was not a “prospectus” for liability purposes under Section 12(2) of the same act, but instead limited to a statutory 
prospectus required for public offerings registered under that act, exempting private placements and secondary resales 
from liability under that statute).  For a mild statement of the reaction of the majority of securities law specialists, see, 
e.g., Peter Letsou, The Scope of Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 45 
Emory L.J. 95, 112 (1996) (“Justice Kennedy's definition ... is difficult to reconcile with the words of the statute.”). 
23 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990) (holding that “notes” were “notes” for purposes of determining 
whether they are “securities” and that demand notes did not fall within the statutory exemption for notes with a 
maturity of less than nine months). 
24 See note 18 supra. 
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post-Powell Rehnquist Court, with a substantial portion of cases expanding the reach of 
the securities law (or at least declining to restrict it), while another substantial portion of 
the cases restricts the law.  
 
Table 4 Years % Securities Law 
Expansive 
% Securities Law 
Restrictive 
% Securities Law 
Neutral 
Pre-Powell era 1936-1972 75% 11% 11% 
Powell era 1973-1987 22% 63% 15% 
Post-Powell 
Rehnquist era 
1988-2004 47% 53% 0% 
Roberts Court 2005-2013 50% 43% 7% 
 
Eras from Sullivan and Thompson, supra note 1.  “Expansive” = “broadening the reach of a securities 
law or regulation, or increasing the likelihood of liability.”  “Restrictive” = “reducing the reach or 
decreasing the likelihood of liability.”  “Neutral” = neither expansive or restrictive. 
 
C. Qualitative Overview 
 
So much for the raw numbers.  But numbers never tell the whole story.  Perhaps the cases 
in which the Roberts Court has been restrictive are more important than the numbers 
suggest, or than in the cases in which it has been expansive.  What have been the 
substantive results of the Roberts Court’s securities law decisions?  Here is a brief 
summary of those decisions: 
 
a. Status Quo Preserving Decisions 
 
Several of the cases essentially preserved the status quo.  Stoneridge
25
 and Janus
26
 
were both decisions rejecting efforts to find a way around Central Bank, which 
disallowed private parties from bringing aiding and abetting suits under Section 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5.  Whatever one may think of the 
merits of Central Bank,
27
 neither Stoneridge nor Janus made substantial changes to the 
Supreme Court’s 1994 decision to restrict the reach of Rule 10b-5 to primary violators.  
Janus did represent an opportunity for the Court to take a realistic position on the actual 
economic and practical function of mutual fund advisors – they are not merely “third 
parties” but the practical locus of control for mutual funds, and hence practically 
responsible for disclosure (fraudulent or not) by the funds they sponsor and advise – a 
point recognized by the Court when it (under)stated that advisors “exercise significant 
influence” over funds.  But the Court, focusing on the corporate formalities, drew a line 
at the separate formal existence of the advisor and the fund, rendering the holding in 
Janus a logical (if formalistic) implication of Central Bank.
28
  Two additional decisions 
classified as “restrictive” – Credit Suisse 29  and Gabelli 30  – concerned statutes of 
                                                 
25 Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 128 S. Ct. 761, 169 L. Ed. 2d 627, 6 
EXC 62 (2008). 
26 Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 180 L. Ed. 2d 166 (2011).  
27 Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164 (1994). 
28 In principle, at least, a fund that was found liable as a direct defendant could also bring its own action against 
its advisor if the advisor were responsible for the misstatement or omission, and its shareholders could sue derivatively 
if the fund board failed to do so. 
29 Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 182 L. Ed. 2d 446 (2012). 
PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE – PLEASE DO NOT CIRCULATE 
 9 
limitations in the securities context.  Neither was so dramatic as to have sweeping 
implications for most securities litigation.  As they address quintessentially “procedural” 
issues, they are discussed more in Part II below. 
 
b. Restrictive Decisions 
 
Two of the remaining “restrictive” decisions – Tellabs31  and Morrison32  – were 
important developments in the important subfield of Rule 10b-5 litigation, while the 
importance of the third – Halliburton II – remains uncertain.  In Tellabs, the Court 
interpreted the requirement in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(PSLRA) requiring private plaintiffs to “state with particularity facts giving rise to a 
strong inference” of scienter.  It held that to pass this test, the facts alleged must be both 
“cogent” and at least as compelling as alternatives, a tougher standard than the test 
articulated by the Seventh Circuit,
33
 viz., whether a “reasonable person could infer” 
scienter from all the facts plead.  At the same time, the Court also rejected other 
formulations of the test, including a test from the Sixth Circuit,
34
 viz., whether an 
inference of scienter was the “most plausible of competing inferences,” which would 
have been tougher than the one adopted in Tellabs.  In effect, the Supreme Court gave 
ties to the plaintiff, while the Sixth had given them to the defendant, and the Seventh had 
only required a good effort.   
 
While the Tellabs decision did tighten standards relative to one possible 
interpretation of the PSLRA, it left a great deal of room for judgment to lower courts in 
applying its approach to the required pleading standard.  Because different judges can be 
expected to apply the Tellabs differently, it may not be surprising that no practical effect 
of the case has been discernible in studies of aggregate litigation rates or outcomes.  This 
is shown by the fact that, as depicted in Figure 1, the number of class actions under Rule 
10b-5 did not drop in 2008, following the 2007 decision in Tellabs.
35
   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
30 Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 133, 133 S. Ct. 1216, 185 L. Ed. 2d 297 (2013). 
31 Tellabs, Inc., Et Al., Petitioners, v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 127 S.Ct. 2499 (2007). 
32 Morrison v. Natl. Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 177 L. Ed. 2d 535 (2010). 
33 437 F.3d 588, 602 (2006). 
34 Fidel v. Farley, 392 F.3d 220, 227 (2004). 
35 Tellabs did coincide with the financial crisis, and a large share (roughly 40%) of the securities class actions 
brought in 2008 are attributed to the crisis by analysts at Cornerstone Research, which might suggest that Tellabs had 
an effect on non-crisis related filings.  Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Filings: 2013 Year in Review, at 
3.  Consistent with this reasoning, if one removed crisis-related filings, 2008 and 2009 would have shown modest 
declines in filings.  However, filings unrelated to either the crisis or M&A have picked back up 2012 and 2013, 
exceeding the numbers from 2007, without any large increase in the numbers of issuers, or external shocks such as the 
crisis, to provide an explanation.   
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Figure 1.  Class Action Private Securities Litigation Filings 
 
Source:  Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Filings:  2013 Year in Review at 3 
 
The “restrictive” decision that had the most important potential practical effect was 
the 2010 decision in Morrison.   That decision held that Section 10(b) of the Securities 
and Exchange Act of 1934 (and thus, Rule 10b-5) does not provide a cause of action for 
misconduct by foreign plaintiffs who purchased securities issued by foreign companies 
on foreign exchanges – hence the “foreign cubed” or “f-cubed” label.  That was true, 
said the Court, even if deceptive conduct itself included that by US citizens in the US, 
because (said the Court) of a canon of statutory interpretation against extraterritorial 
application of federal statutes absent clear intent by Congress.  While the “location” of 
the purchase and trading of intangibles can be something of a metaphysical question – 
suppose, for example, that an offer to purchase is made in the US but the acceptance is 
made outside the US, or vice versa, or the security was “issued” in the US but then 
purchased and subsequently retraded outside the US, or both offer and acceptance are 
made by foreign traders outside the US but they connect via an exchange owned by a US 
trading platform, etc. – there are clearly cases such as Morrison where a great deal of the 
activity relevant to purchases and sales of securities occurs beyond US borders, and the 
Roberts Court clearly sought to push litigation arising out of such transactions out of the 
US federal courts.   
 
Practically, this case was of importance not only because it restricts the reach of US 
securities law on the relatively unusual fact pattern in Morrison – where a foreign buyer 
buys and repeats statements made by a deceptive US target and foreign investors who 
bought securities in the foreign buyer sue after the deception is revealed and the buyer’s 
stock price falls – but because it reduces the size of relevant classes of investors in cases 
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involving issuers with some shares trading in the US.
36
  Smaller classes would lead to 
smaller damage awards in those rare instances a securities law case proceeds to trial, and 
expectations of smaller awards should lead to smaller settlements, and smaller 
settlements should lead to fewer cases in expectation.
37
  Morrison had disturbing 
implications for the ability of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and US 
Department of Justice (DOJ) to police securities-related deceptive misconduct that clearly 
occurs in the US.  However, on that front, Congress quickly intervened in the Dodd-
Frank Act
38
 to provide the necessary affirmative indication of extraterritoriality for 
Section 10(b) actions involving transnational securities frauds brought by the 
Commission and DOJ.  Congress further directed the SEC to conduct a study of whether 
that authority should extend to private actions, which the SEC completed in 2012.
39
  That 
study concluded that “news of the ... June 24, 2010 decision in Morrison ... [did not 
produce] a statistically significant stock price reaction for U.S. cross-listed companies” 
and that the staff was “unable to document evidence of either economic costs or 
economic benefits that could be clearly and directly linked to extending a private right of 
action.”40  While the study laid out possible options for further re-extending the reach of 
Morrison to some foreign-cubed private actions, it seems unlikely that Congress will do 
so in the near future.   
 
c. Halliburton II 
 
In the most recent restrictive decisions, Halliburton II,
41
 the Court overturned the 
Fifth Circuit’s holding that evidence of lack of price impact could not be used to rebut the 
Basic presumption at the class certification stage of a Section 10(b) Exchange Act private 
action.  As a result, defendants in such cases will have an additional ability to block class 
certification by showing that the alleged misrepresentations had no impact on the price of 
the stock when made.  The holding was similar to, but – because it put the burden on the 
defendant – slightly less restrictive than proposals advanced by legal academics.42  This 
                                                 
36 Subsequent lower court cases have limited Morrison in some ways (such as by permitting actions based on 
trading in American Depository Receipts representing interests in foreign-listed securities) and expanded on it in other 
ways (such as by dismissing actions by plaintiffs who purchased a security on a foreign stock exchange even if the 
security is part of a class that is also cross-listed on a US exchange, or by dismissing actions against US-based 
intermediaries who invested the plaintiffs’ money in foreign securities purchased outside the US).   
37 Elaine Buckberg and Max Gulker, Cross-Border Shareholder Class Actions Before and After Morrison (NERA 
working paper 2011) report that “filings against foreign companies” did not immediately decline following the 
Morrison decision, but it would be of interest to revisit that factual question now that more time has elapsed for 
litigation outcomes and strategies to respond. 
38 Section 929P(b)(2) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. 
39 Securities and Exchange Commission, Study on the Cross-Border Scope of the Private Right of Action under 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/929y-study-
cross-border-private-rights.pdf (last visited March 10, 2014).   
40 Id. at B1. 
41 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., No. 13-317, 573 U. S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014). 
42 See Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John 
Fund, Inc., No. 13-317, 2014 WL 60721 (arguing that the plaintiff should have to prove price impact through an event 
study prior to class certification); Lucian Bebchuk and Allen Farrell, Rethinking Basic, 69 Bus. Law. 671 (2014) 
(arguing that the Basic presumption be replaced by the use of a combination of event studies focused on time of 
misstatement, event studies focused on time of corrective disclosure, and “forward-casting” studies that relate 
suppressed bad information in a given instance, such as in a false earnings release, to average impact of similar 
information in other instances, such as when unexpected bad earnings information has been announced by other 
companies).   
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was apparently an important difference for three of the Justices (Ginsburg, Breyer, and 
Sotomayor), as noted in their brief concurrence.
43
 
 
The importance of the decision is unclear.  The Court did not sweep as far as 
defendants sought, refusing to reverse the holding in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson
44
 that 
plaintiffs in such cases should be presumed to have relied on alleged misrepresentations 
when they purchased securities in a publicly traded stock, because the market price would 
have reflected the effect of those misrepresentations.  Had the Court gone that far, it 
would have been the most significant securities law decision in the Roberts era.   
 
The actual holding was more modest, although the significance of its effects is 
uncertain.  Some argue that the holding will be generally unimportant, since most 
securities class actions are prompted by a drop in the stock price that follows revelation 
of bad information (hence the moniker “stock drop” cases), and the only disputed issue is 
whether the defendant fraudulently concealed the information.
45
  This argument assumes 
that the relevant evidence of “price impact” in a typical case is when corrective disclosure 
is made, and the stock drops, and not when the original misstatement was made.  While 
plausible as a method to implement Halliburton II in many cases, such an approach 
would move away from the question that nominally framed the decision, that is, whether 
reliance can be presumed because “efficient” market prices reflect misstatements, as 
accepted in Basic.  As Larry Mitchell has noted,
46
  
 
The vast majority of securities fraud cases do not involve alleged false statements 
of positive news that might be expected to increase the value of the stock price. 
Rather, ... the false statement ...  conceals a development adversely affecting the 
[issuer]. Under those circumstances, there is little or no "impact" on the stock at 
the time the false statement is made; the false statement minimizes or prevents the 
decline that would ... have occurred had investors been [informed and] given the 
opportunity to ... reassess the value of their investments. A measurable "impact" 
on the stock price in such circumstances would not be seen until a "corrective 
disclosure" occurs, which could be substantially after the fraudulent statement is 
made. 
 
As noted by Bebchuk and Ferrell, a common form of misstatement is the “confirmatory 
lie,” i.e., a statement that merely confirms what the market already (falsely) believes 
about a company, such as an earnings release that matches analyst expectations (when in 
fact the company’s earnings are falsely inflated by fraud).47  In such cases, there will no 
price impact at the time of the lie, only when corrective disclosure is made.  Corrective 
                                                 
43 134 S. Ct. at 2417. 
44  485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
45 John F. Savarese, George T. Conway III, and Charles D. Cording, Reflections on Halliburton (July 1, 2014) 
(client memo on file with author). 
46  Lawrence Mitchell on Halliburton v. Erica P. John Fund and the Other Law Professors, Business Law Prof 
Blog (Apr. 27, 2014), available at http://bit.ly/1n0X6XT (last visited July 18, 2014). 
47 Lucian Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell, Remarks on the Halliburton Oral Argument (2): Implementing a Fraudulent 
Distortion Approach, The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (March 12, 
2014, 9:10 AM) (emphasis added), available at https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/03/12/remarks-on-the-
halliburton-oral-argument-2-implementing-a-fraudulent-distortion-approach/ (last visited July 18, 2014). 
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disclosure, it should be remembered, reveals two things, which affect price 
simultaneously:  they reveal the information in the corrective disclosure, and they reveal 
that the company had previously provided false information to the market (perhaps 
inadvertently, perhaps not, but false nonetheless).  This makes “back-casting” the results 
of an event study of the corrective disclosure a noisy and contestable tool for purposes of 
inferring reliance (on market prices and hence on the misstatement).  Further, in some 
instances, companies may have an ability to game the holding, by pairing the release of 
negative information with positive information, confounding the price impact that any 
one statement would have, and increasing the likelihood that (later, in a subsequently 
brought case) the defendant company will be able to show that an alleged 
misrepresentation (or corrective disclosure that is also paired with positive news) did not 
impact the price when made.   
 
It remains unclear how lower courts will wrestle with these complications.  Lower 
courts may view a non-finding of price impact around dual-effect statements as 
insufficient to block class certification, on the ground that the defendant has the burden of 
proof on the point and the confounding effects are attributable to the defendant.  Other 
courts may decide that such non-findings warrant shifting the burden back to the 
plaintiffs to prove actual reliance.  Plaintiffs will point to any contemporaneous statement 
as a reason for a non-finding of price impact, while defendants will argue that the 
arguable confounding are not plausibly material and so not actual confounds.   
 
The only certain effect of Halliburton II, then, will be to generate more disputes on 
how to interpret and apply the holding, all at the pre-certification stage.  Defendants and 
plaintiffs’ lawyers alike will face higher costs – in the form of briefing designed to elicit 
interpretations to permit the decision to be implemented, and in the form of experts in 
finance (or at least those who can carry out a useful event study with authority), who can 
study and opine on price impact at the certification stage, prior to discovery.  The effect 
of the increased costs may not be symmetric, at least for large defendants in some 
settings:  these pre-certification proceedings will increase litigation risks for both sides, 
but large defendants are likely to be able to better bear those risks than plaintiffs’ law 
firms.  In some cases, moreover, the new procedural defense may produce results (i.e., a 
showing of no price impact) that may effectively bring the case to an end, but the result 
will never be better than would have occurred prior to Halliburton II.  Hence, the case is 
clearly restrictive, even if the Ginsburg concurrence turns out to be correct that the result 
will not be a “heavy toll on ... tenable claims.”48 
 
d. Reconciling Halliburton II with Amgen and Halliburton I 
 
Halliburton II is also in tension with Amgen and Halliburton I, earlier Roberts’ Court 
cases.  In Amgen, a 6-3 decision, the Court refused to allow defendants to argue that, 
because the misstatements were immaterial and so could not impact price, the Basic 
presumption did not apply and a class could not be certified;
49
 in Halliburton I, the Court 
                                                 
48 134 S. Ct. at 2417. 
49 Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 568 U.S. ––––, ––––, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013). 
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reached the same bottom-line with respect to loss causation.
50
  Materiality and loss 
causation could not be considered on class certification, held the Court in those cases, 
because resolution of those issues would not determine whether common issues 
predominated over individual ones under Rule 23(b)(3).  If the misstatements were not 
material or caused no loss, all putative class members’ claims would fail, and if they were 
material and caused loss, then all claims could survive, under Basic.  
 
The reasoning in those cases, commented litigators at Wachtell Lipton (after the case 
was decided),
51
 should have led Halliburton II to come out the other way:  
 
If there is no price impact in an efficient market, not only can there be no 
materiality, there can also be no causation, no damages, and no claim. ... As the 
Fifth Circuit held, the claims rise and fall together, and the common issues 
predominate, regardless of whether or not there is price impact.   
 
Put differently, one common way to show materiality and prove loss causation is to show 
that a misstatement or corrective disclosure has a price impact – functionally equivalent 
to the defense created by Halliburton II.   
 
The Court in Halliburton II conceded the validity of this critique, calling it “fair 
enough.” 52   But the Court ultimately decided to allow defendants to rebut the 
presumption—and defeat class certification—with evidence of a lack of price impact. 
The Court reasoned (correctly) that materiality and reliance are “discrete” legal issues, 
and (correctly) that other elements of proof (such as publicity) would be relevant at both 
the certification and merits stages of a case, and left it at that. 
 
A concurrence written by Thomas, joined by Scalia and Alito, advocated completely 
overruling Basic,
53
 on the ground that market prices cannot be and are not relied upon by 
investors, a position that is somewhat ironic given their pro-market, de-regulatory 
ideological commitments.
54
  But their concurrence did not make much of the 
inconsistency between Amgen and the majority opinion in Halliburton II.  That may be 
because one of those concurring (Alito) in fact voted with the majority in Amgen.  If one 
views Amgen and Halliburton II as inconsistent, six of nine justices switched positions in 
the space of a year.  (Kennedy voted in the minority in Amgen, along with Scalia and 
Thomas.)  If one views Halliburton I and Halliburton II as inconsistent, all nine justices 
switched positions in the space of three years. 
                                                 
50 Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. ––––, ––––, 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2185–2186 (2011).   
51 Savarese et al. supra note 43. 
52 Halliburton, supra note 41 at 2416. 
53 134 S. Ct. at 2417 et seq. 
54 Prior to going on the bench, Scalia was general counsel of the United States Office of Telecommunications 
Policy (which promoted telecommunications deregulation) from 1972 to 1974, and from 1977 to 1981 was coeditor-in-
chief of the American Enterprise Institute's magazine, REGULATION, which consistently advocated abolition of 
economic regulation in competitive markets and improvement-through reform of health, safety, and environmental 
regulation. See Archive of REGULATION issues, www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regulmpast_issues.html.  Alito’s 
personal qualifications statement in seeking a position in the Reagan administration stated, “I believe very strongly in 
limited government, federalism [and] free enterprise.”  Available at http://bit.ly/1qOR9Nz (last visited July 18, 2014). 
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Might we see in these inconsistencies a lack of strong interest in securities law by the 
Supreme Court?  Might the justices might have weak preferences that align with their 
ideological commitments, discussed more below, but be willing to give them up in a type 
of within-term horse-trading if doing so will buy them goodwill or a vote in another case 
involving issues about which they care more?
55
 
 
Or do these inconsistencies suggest that framing effects
56
 can influence even 
Supreme Court Justice?  The result in Halliburton II was a termed a “midway position” 
by Justice Kennedy during oral argument,
57
 because it was not as extreme as the “reverse 
Basic position advocated by defendants and many amici, but neither was it a complete 
plaintiff victory.  The equivalent result in Amgen, by contrast, would have been precisely 
what the defendant requested, because there the effort to reverse Basic was not front and 
center.  In other words, this outcome might have been the product of clever litigation 
tactics – by pushing hard for a complete reversal of Basic (invited by the dissenters in 
Amgen, as well as by Alito in his brief concurrence in that case)
58
 – the defendant was 
able to achieve a result that could not have been achieved had it simply asked for that 
result on its own.  
  
Or, finally, is it the case that what distinguishes Halliburton II from Amgen and 
Halliburton I can be found in legal formalism?  As the majority opinion states, 
materiality and loss causation are formally class-wide questions (as a matter of law), and 
(actual) reliance is not.  The formal legal implication is that a presumption of reliance 
should be available for rebuttal at the class certification stage, even if rebutting that 
presumption will involve reviewing evidence that overlaps with, and may even be 
identical to, legal issues (materiality and loss causation) that will arise again at the merits 
stage.  This way of reconciling the cases is not inconsistent with the above explanations – 
perhaps legal formalism would matter less in cases implications stronger political 
commitments, or if the psychological framing of the cases had been identical.  In other 
words, perhaps the best way to understand the Court is to think of law, politics and 
litigation tactics as all mattering, in different combinations in different cases.   
 
e. Expansive Decisions 
 
What of the Roberts Court’s record on expansionary securities law decisions?  Most 
                                                 
55 E.g., Lee Epstein and Jack Knight, The Choices Justices Make 9-10 (1998) (advancing ideological preferences 
is only one of many motives and judges sometimes behave strategically). 
56 E.g., D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, Choices, values, and frames, 39 Am. Psych. 341-50 (1984). 
57 Oral Argument Transcript, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., No. 13-317 (Mar. 5, 2014), at 17, 
available at http://1.usa.gov/1nEuuj1 (last visited July 18, 2014). 
58 See Donald C. Langevoort, Judgment Day for Fraud-on-the-Market?:  Reflections on Amgen and the Second 
Coming of Halliburton, Working Paper (Nov. 16, 2013) at 2 (“The three dissenters made clear that they thought Basic 
was wrongly decided in 1988, and Justice Alito joined the majority but wrote a cryptic concurrence strongly suggesting 
that the Basic presumption has a shaky foundation that warrants future reconsideration by the Court. The defense bar 
wasted no time in taking up the four justices’ invitation and sought review in a case that had already been up once to 
the Court, Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton Co., now asking that Basic be overruled. Certiorari was granted in 
November 2013.”).   
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were as modest as the majority of restrictive decisions.  Jones
59
 rejected a decision by 
Judge Frank Easterbrook
60
 that would have ruled out consideration of comparative fee 
data in cases under section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act, which provides a 
private right of action for mutual fund investors to sue over “excessive” fees, but the 
Court did not articulate any test of its own in its place, being content to return the lower 
courts to the Gartenberg standard established by the Second Circuit in 1982.
61
  The 
decision is thus expansive relative to an alternative, lower court holding, but no more so 
than prior law.   
 
Both Halliburton I
62
 and Amgen
63
 rejected efforts to impose requirements on the 
class certification stage of securities litigation – better understood as “not restrictive” 
rather than “expansive” – and (in the case of Amgen), effectively overturned in many 
settings by Halliburton II.  Similarly, Matrixx
64
 rejected a specific statistically based test 
for the “materiality” qualifier of Rule 10b-5 and many other securities rules.  Merck65 
affirmed a Third Circuit decision preserving inquiry notice for commencement of the 
statute of limitations period in Rule 10b-5 cases, linked to when a plaintiff should be on 
notice about the defendants’ scienter, and not merely when a plaintiff should have been 
on notice about the related misstatement or omission – again, a decision preserving the 
majority rule among lower courts that had confronted the issue.   
 
Of the decisions “expanding” the reach of securities litigation, only the Lawson66 and 
Troice
67
 decisions from the October 2013 term are genuinely expansive, and the practical 
importance of each remains uncertain. The odds that a future Charles Ponzi will sell 
certificates of deposit backed even indirectly by listed securities, as was the fact-pattern 
in Troice, and therefore outside the preemptive scope of the SLUSA,
68
 remains (like the 
extent of so much fraudulent activity) as speculative as any “blue sky” investment 
scheme.  In Lawson, a 6-3 decision, the Court vigorously debated the frequency with 
which an employee of a contractor for a public company would obtain information about 
securities violations and seek “whistleblower” status under Sarbanes-Oxley.  There does 
not seem to be any study that provides even rough information on the question.  If any of 
these decisions has a general expansive effect, it will be to permit more “whistleblower” 
lawsuits against mutual fund advisory companies, such as Fidelity, the defendant in 
Lawson, than would have been permitted by the dissent’s reading of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act’s unclear language, coupled with the kind of formalist “factual” predicate deployed 
in Janus (i.e., that advisors are formally distinct legal entities from the funds they create, 
                                                 
59 Jones v. Harris Assocs., 559 U.S. 335, 130 S. Ct. 1418, 176 L. Ed. 2d 265 (2010).  See John C. Coates IV, The 
Downside of Judicial Restraint:  The (Non-) Effect of Jones v. Harris, 6 Duke J. of Constitutional Law and Public 
Policy 58 (2010). 
60 527 F. 3d 627, 632 (2008), motion to rehear en banc denied 537 F. 3d 728 (2008) (per curiam). 
61 Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., 694 F. 2d 923 (CA2 1982).  For a discussion of 
Gartenberg, see John C. Coates and R. Glenn Hubbard, Competition in the Mutual Fund Industry:  Evidence and 
Implications for Policy, 33 J. Corp. L. 152 (2007).   
62 Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 180 L. Ed. 2d 24 (2011). 
63 Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 185 L. Ed. 2d 308 (2013). 
64 Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 179 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2011). 
65 Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 176 L. Ed. 2d 582 (2010). 
66 Lawson v. FMR LLC, No. 12-3, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 118 L. Ed. 2d 158 (2014). 
67 Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, No. 12-79, 12-86, and 12-88, 2014 BL 51065 (U.S. Feb. 26, 2014). 
68 15 U.S.C. §78bb(f)(1). 
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sell and advise).   
 
In sum, the quantitative assessment above more or less lines up with a qualitative 
assessment of the Roberts Court’s securities law jurisprudence.  With the exception of 
Morrison, that body of case law is composed of a modest number of modest decisions 
that mostly preserve rather than alter the status quo, even if they resolve some Circuit-
splitting ambiguities created by Congress since 1995 (the PSLRA, SLUSA and the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act).  Overall, their qualitative effects are more restrictive than the 
quantitative analysis would suggest, as the effects of Morrison, and possibly Tellabs and 
Halliburton II, are likely to dominate the effects of Troice and Lawson.  Rather than 
being particularly expansive or restrictive, pro-manager or pro-shareholder (or pro-SEC), 
these cases are perhaps better characterized on different, more “legal” dimensions, as 
articulating loosely stated standards and emphasizing procedure, as discussed next. 
 
Part II.  An Emphasis on Procedure and Standards 
 
How can we best understand securities law decisions in the Roberts Court?  This Part 
of the paper breaks down the cases reviewed in Part I on two dimensions – (a) procedural 
versus substantive, and (b) bright-lines versus standards – and shows that the outcomes of 
the cases map reasonably well onto those dimensions.  That is, expansive decisions are 
most common when lower courts had based restrictive decisions on bright-line, 
substantive decisional rules, and they are least common when lower courts had based 
restrictive decisions on procedural standards.   
 
A. A Pure Attitudinal Model and Securities Law Cases under Chief Roberts 
 
Before analyzing the Roberts Court’s securities law cases in more detail, it is worth 
asking if the simple political science attitudinal model can explain the case outcomes.  
The analysis produces a bit of a puzzle:  while individual justices vote as one would 
expect, the overall results do not add up to a set of predictable outcomes.  Something else 
must be going on besides party politics.   
 
In the simplest version of an attitudinal model, one would predict that Republican-
appointees would vote for restrictive decisions, and Democrat-appointees would vote for 
expansive decisions.  To be sure, securities law is an area where the standard Republican 
= business/manager-friendly and Democrat = consumer/worker-friendly polarities do not 
always dominate.  Business interests in a general sense have an interest in law that 
punishes and deters fraud, because that will translate into lower capital costs for non-
fraudulent issuers.  It would likely not be beneficial for business if (hypothetically) 
securities fraud were to be legalized, or even to be made significantly easier to perpetrate.  
The typical plaintiff in a high-profile securities case is an investor – usually a class of 
investors, sometimes including large institutions that have more in common with other 
for-profit businesses than with individual consumers or workers.  In Stoneridge, the 
plaintiff was a hedge fund; in Amgen, it was public pension fund; in Central Bank, it was 
a national bank.  Even if Republican-appointees would always favor business interests, 
the nature of securities law case plaintiffs would at least leave some cases uncertain in 
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outcome.  Still, as a general matter, most plaintiffs in securities class actions are 
individuals, and their representatives are lawyers – who are clearly identified in public 
discourse as a Democratic lobby and political force, suggesting that, at least on average, 
this simple model might have some traction despite the potential ideological complexities 
of some securities law disputes.   
 
As a first pass, a simple attitudinal model does fit the votes on the three, and only, 
close cases under Chief Roberts:  PCAOB, Stoneridge, and Janus, where each of the 
majority votes was appointed by a Republican and each of the dissents was either 
appointed by a Democrat or (in the cases of Justices Stevens and Souter) drifted “left” to 
become de facto members of the Court’s liberal wing.69  The average “expansive” vote 
among the Democrat-appointees Justices (51%) is greater than that among the 
Republican-appointees (41%), and each of the former votes more expansively on average 
than each of the latter.  As shown in Table 5, Democrat appointees’ expansive votes 
range from 62% to 67% and Republican appointees’ expansive votes ranging from 29% 
to 54%.  These individual vote shares correlate fairly well with the Segal-Cover ex ante 
measure of ideology at time of confirmation (correlation coefficient = 0.6, p-value 
<0.043), although less well with the Quinn-Martin dynamic measure of votes over time 
(correlation coefficient = -0.6, p-value < 0.075).  A simple regression of expansiveness in 
securities law cases on Segal-Cover scores generates a positive coefficient of 0.54 
(standard error = 0.22, p-value <0.042, R-squared 0.42). 
 
Table 5 
Segal-Cover 
Score 
Quinn-Martin 
Scores as of 2012 
% Expansive Votes in Securities 
Law Cases 
Sotomayor 0.780 0.287 64% 
Kagan 0.730 0.322 67% 
Ginsburg 0.680 0.190 64% 
Breyer 0.475 0.439 62% 
Kennedy 0.365 1.636 29% 
Thomas 0.160 4.782 43% 
Roberts 0.120 2.837 54% 
Alito 0.100 3.345 36% 
Scalia 0.000 3.326 43% 
    
Notes:  Justices Stevens and Souter are omitted because they only voted in three and two of the securities law cases 
under Chief Roberts, respectively.  The Segal-Cover scores are an estimate of the ideology of the Justice based on 
editorials at the time of their confirmations, available at 
www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/polisci/jsegal/QualTable.pdf (last visited March 11, 2014).  The Quinn-Martin 
scores are another estimate of the ideology of the Justices based on votes over time, and are available at 
mqscores.wu (last visited March 11, 2014). 
 
However, the overall Roberts Court’s securities law case outcomes do not map well 
the Justices’ partisan affiliations.  In more than half (53%) of the cases, the decision was 
unanimous, so partisan ideology has no straightforward role to play in explaining these 
votes.  In Tellabs, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer voted in favor of the restrictive outcome, 
                                                 
69  For evidence of these Justices’ drift left, see Andrew D. Martin and Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Point 
Estimation Via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the US. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, Political Analysis 10:2 134-53 
(2002), at 146 (Stevens) and Andrew D. Martin and Kevin M. Quinn, Can Ideal Point Estimates Be Used as 
Explanatory Variables?, Working Paper (Oct. 8, 2005), available at http://mqscores.wustl.edu/media/resnote.pdf (last 
visited March 11, 2014), at 11. 
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while only Justice Stevens dissented.  In the recent Lawson decision, Justice Sotomayor 
penned a dissent joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito – a relatively unusual grouping 
based on partisan affiliation alone, as was the majority, which included three left- and 
three right-leaning Justices.  In Amgen, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined the 
left wing of the Court, while in Troice, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and 
Scalia joined the left wing.  The most expansive Democrat appointee (Sotomayor) voted 
expansively only two-thirds of the time, and the least expansive voted expansively almost 
a quarter of the time, and the difference between Chief Justice Roberts (54% expansive) 
and Justice Breyer (62% expansive) is not large.   
 
Most importantly, overall, the ideological model would not predict the relative 
balance between expansion and restriction.  That is because the majority of Republican 
appointees bent on pursuing narrowly framed, politically ideological ends would have 
been able to push through an entirely restrictive set of decisions.  If one sets aside the 
neutral PCAOB decision, the partisan-only model would have predicted all fourteen of 
the remaining cases would have come out restrictive, when in fact seven came out 
expansive.  A correct classification percentage of 50% (seven out of fourteen) is precisely 
the same as a coin toss. 
 
B. Procedural Cases 
 
What besides partisan identity might better rationalize the case outcomes 
summarized in Part I?  One possible dimension of variation is procedure vs. substance.  
Just under half (seven, or 47%) of the fifteen securities law cases were not primarily 
about interpretations or open questions under the substantive securities laws or related 
rules, but about aspects of procedure that are special to the securities law context.  Thus, 
these are not “procedural” in the general sense – not necessarily coded as “Civil 
Procedure” by the SCD database – but nonetheless raise predominantly procedural 
questions.  These are summarized in Table 7.   
 
Table 7 Procedural Aspect Expansive 
Outcome? 
Merck Inquiry notice for statute of limitations for Section 10(b) Yes 
Morrison Quasi-jurisdictional reach of securities laws No 
Halliburton I Loss causation before class certification Yes 
Credit Suisse Equitable tolling for statute of limitations under Section 16 No 
Gabelli Commencement of statute of limitations period for IAA No 
Amgen Proof of materiality prior to class certification Yes 
Halliburton II Ability to rely on market price as proof of reliance No 
   
 
More procedural cases are “restrictive” (57% for procedural cases vs. 43% for 
substantive cases), but given small numbers, this difference could be due to random 
chance.  Nonetheless, the simple scheme of typing the cases does a better job of 
classifying the cases than the attitudinal model (57% vs. 50%).  Further making the 
importance of procedure plausible is the fact that six of the seven (86%) procedural 
decisions were unanimous, as compared to only two of the remaining eight (25%) 
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decisions.  As a result, the procedural categorization may explain those outcomes that 
cannot map onto partisan identities.   
 
Morrison illustrates the inevitable line-drawing problem at the border of procedure 
and substance.  Formally, the Supreme Court in Morrison rejected the Second Circuit’s 
holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide the case.  Jurisdiction, the 
Court held, was granted in the federal securities statutes.  Instead, the Court dismissed the 
case because it “interpreted” Rule 10b-5 itself as not covering f-cubed cases, based on a 
“principle” of interpretation that disfavors extraterritorial reach of federal statutes.  One 
could view Morrison as addressing the substance of the securities laws.  However, 
nothing in the Court’s reasoning relates to the purpose or goals of those laws, and instead 
the Court’s “interpretation” is derived from a trans-substantive commitment to limiting 
the reach of all federal laws with identical effect as a decision that the courts lack 
jurisdiction.  Few observers would understand the difference between the Court’s holding 
and the Second Circuit’s holding that the Court purported to reverse unless they read the 
Court’s opinion.  Morrison is best classified (for future predictive purposes), then, as a 
procedural decision, and so too with other cases involving similar extraterritorial 
questions. 
 
C. Resistance to Bright-Line Rules 
 
Another means to classify the securities law cases is to break them down into those 
in which a bright-line rule was a part of the lower court decision, or not.  Coding cases as 
“bright-line rules” versus “standards” is even more subjective than coding them as 
expansive or restrictive, or procedural versus substantive.  But as with those distinctions, 
in a few cases, the use of bright-line rules is a clear part of a lower-court case:  Jones, 
where the Seventh Circuit sought to preclude recoveries in Section 36(b) cases based 
solely on comparative fee evidence; Matrixx, where the Ninth Circuit sought to base 
findings of materiality on showings of statistical significance in a factual inquiry on the 
relevant disclosure; and Credit Suisse, where the Ninth Circuit had adopted a bright-line 
test automatically tolling the statute of limitations for Section 16(b) cases until the insider 
had filed the requisite form under Section 16(a).  In each case, the Supreme Court 
reversed the decision – in two cases expanding the reach of the securities laws (Jones and 
Matrixx) and in the other case restricting it (Credit Suisse).  Again, all three of these anti-
bright-line decisions were unanimous – making it easier to understand the outcomes 
where partisan-affiliation cannot provide an explanation.   
 
In contrast to these three cases, several of the other case holdings articulated classic 
“standards” in both the lower court and in the Supreme Court.  In Troice, the Court had to 
interpret the phrases “in connection with” the “purchase or sale of a covered security.”  
The factual context – a Ponzi scheme in which the securities sold were not covered 
securities but where part of the marketing pitch was that the proceeds of the sales of non-
covered securities would be used by the issuer to purchase covered securities – was not 
clearly included or excluded by the explicit language of SLUSA.  Each of the majority 
and the dissent (and the lower court) had to give meaning to “in connection with.”  The 
majority held that the phrase only included false statements “material to” a purchase of a 
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covered security; the dissent, by contrast, would have read the phrase to include false 
statements that “coincided with” and “furthered” the sales or purchases of covered 
securities.  Neither interpretation is self-defining – the majority’s reading merely transfers 
the inquiry to the equally standard-like word “material,” which has given rise to very 
large numbers of disputes and different interpretations, while the dissent’s reading 
requires an interpretation of what counts as “furthering” the requisite transaction in 
covered securities.  The result of either standard would be more potential disputes in 
future cases.   
 
The only exception to this pattern is Janus.  In Janus, the Court’s formalist approach 
to mutual funds effectively leads to a bright-line outcome, allowing for easy dismissal of 
cases in which fund advisors are sued on the basis that they had practical control over 
fund disclosures.  It is worth noting that Janus is one of the Court’s few contested 
decisions, splitting 5-4, and concerns a subspecialization (the interaction of the 
Investment Company Act and the Securities Act of 1933) that few lawyers (even 
corporate lawyers) ever master. 
 
If one combines the procedural vs. substantive classification with a “bright-line” 
dummy variable (taking on the value of -1 for a lower court with a bright-line restrictive 
rule, 0 for a lower court with a standard, and +1 for a lower with a bright-line expansive 
rule), this simple combined model successfully classifies 70% of the cases as either 
expansive or restrictive. 
 
The above analysis should not be understood in any meaningful sense as “hypothesis 
testing,” “science,” or anything similar.  If it were, the small numbers of cases would be 
rightly labeled “overfitting,” even with the simple two-variable model used.  Rather, the 
analysis is exploratory data analysis, designed to generate a hypothesis.  The only slightly 
complex hypothesis that emerges is this:   
 
Under Chief Justice Roberts, securities law cases will (more often) have outcomes 
that expand the reach of securities law if they involve substantive (i.e., non-
procedural) securities law or a bright-line rule used by the court below to restrict 
the reach of securities law, but will more often result in restrictive outcomes if 
they involve procedures or a bright-line rule used by the court below to expand 
the reach of securities law.   
 
This hypothesis can only be tested with more case data.  It is reassuring that the one 
case decided after these hypotheses were generated – Halliburton II – fits them like a 
glove.  It was restrictive, but not sweepingly so.  It was procedural, adding a defense to 
class certification, a quintessential element of procedure.  It rejected two bright-line rules, 
both the one used by the Court below, to rule out consideration of price impact at the 
class certification stage altogether, and the one advanced by the defense, to reject Basic 
altogether, and require proof of reliance by each member of the class, which would have 
effectively been a bright-line rule against class actions.  A “sample” of one is, of course, 
not a meaningful test of these hypotheses, which necessarily await future cases.  Time 
will tell. 
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Part III.  A Jurisprudence Focused on Procedure and Standards 
 
Why might the Roberts Court’s securities jurisprudence be better explained with 
attendance to the role of procedure and loosely phrased standards than by the political 
backgrounds of the Justices?  In this last part of the Article, the background of Chief 
Justice Roberts and the Court’s more general revival of a focus on civil procedure are 
briefly reviewed, as context for understanding the analysis of securities law cases above, 
followed by brief sketches of what implications this broader context has for the future of 
securities law under Chief Roberts. 
 
A. Roberts’s Background as an Appellate Litigator 
 
Chief Justice Roberts was of course a Republican appointee, with solid credentials as 
a member of two Republican administrations.  But it is also worth remembering that he 
had spent his career within the upper reaches of the U.S. appellate litigation system 
before going on the bench.
70
   At Harvard, he earned a bachelor’s degree (in history) in 
three years (graduating summa), followed by a law degree and, showing his interest in 
law-related management, a turn as managing editor of the Harvard Law Review.  He 
clerked for Judge Henry J. Friendly on the Second Circuit and Justice William H. 
Rehnquist on the U.S. Supreme Court, and then worked on and off for twelve years in the 
federal government, principally as a litigator – first as Special Assistant to the Attorney 
General, then as Associate Counsel in the White House Counsel’s Office, and finally as 
Principal Deputy Solicitor General.  For seven years, in two periods separated by his stint 
as Deputy Solicitor General, he practiced law at the D.C. law firm of what was then 
Hogan & Hartson and is now Hogan Lovells, first as an associate and then partner.
71
  
Roberts served no time as a lawyer in private practice as a securities lawyer, other than in 
his role as an appellate litigator.  (As noted at the outset, no transactional lawyer – 
corporate or securities from a non-litigation perspective – has served on the Supreme 
Court since Justice Powell.) 
 
On Roberts’s return to private practice, he headed the firm’s appellate practice 
group,
72
 taught as an adjunct law professor at Georgetown,
73
 and argued 39 cases before 
the Supreme Court.  The first of those cases was – of note for this article – a securities 
law case,
74
 and one that involved quintessentially procedural questions.  Specifically, the 
case posed the issue of how courts should decide who should decide whether a contract 
dispute was subject to arbitration.  Roberts, representing defendants who had successfully 
resisted confirmation of the arbitration award in the Third Circuit, lost the legal question 
in the Supreme Court.  He argued that courts should apply a de novo standard to their 
review of an arbitrator’s decision about the scope of arbitration, but the Court held that 
                                                 
70  Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court of the U.S., 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited July 20, 2014). 
71 "Former Hogan & Hartson Partner John G. Roberts, Jr. Confirmed as Chief Justice of the United States" (Press 
release), Hogan Lovells, (Sep. 29, 2005) (last visited July 20, 2014). 
72 Id. 
73 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Roberts (last visited July 20, 2014). 
74 E.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc., v. Kaplan et al., 514 U.S. 938 (1995). 
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lower courts should apply a deferential standard of review.
75
 
 
Nevertheless, Roberts won on the law as applied to the facts, because the company 
seeking confirmation of the award had not produced clear evidence that the defendants 
had agreed to arbitration.  The Supreme Court endorsed a split standard on how to 
address ambiguous evidence on the scope of arbitration:  (1) if the record showed the 
parties had agreed to arbitration, but disputed the precise scope of the arbitration, or if the 
record was silent on the scope, courts should presume arbitrability from silence, in line 
with a policy favoring arbitration reflected in the Federal Arbitration Act; but (2) if the 
record was silent – or indeed, if there was no clear and convincing evidence – on whether 
they had agreed to arbitration at all – courts should (at least under the state law relevant 
in that case) presume arbitrability is not for the arbitrator to decide.
76
  In other words, 
silence weighs in favor of arbitration in the presence of an arbitration agreement, but 
against arbitration in the absence of one.   
 
The decision in First Options – the product of Roberts’s personal experience as a 
litigator, and likely one of the most vivid, as his first and successful Supreme Court 
argument in private practice – is a cartoon of legal complexity.  Instead of a simple rule, 
such as “arbitration’s scope is for the arbitrator” or “arbitration’s scope is for the court,” 
or even a rule subject to exceptions, such as “arbitration’s scope is for the arbitrator, 
absent fraud,” the Court announced a multilayered, complex system of standards.  First, 
because arbitration’s scope is determined by agreement, it will vary with choice of law, 
since different jurisdictions have different rules for interpreting private agreements, 
particularly when the agreement is silent or ambiguous.  Second, First Options assigns to 
the arbitrator the question of deciding the scope of arbitration if the agreement is unclear, 
based on the policy of favoring arbitration.  Third, that assignment is subject to review by 
a court, but under a deferential standard of review.  Fourth, that assignment falls away if 
the parties have not agreed to arbitration at all, contrary to the policy favoring arbitration.  
Fifth, silence or ambiguity as to whether the parties have agreed to arbitration will return 
decisions over scope to the court, who can decide on its own (as the Supreme Court itself 
did in First Options) if there is clear and convincing evidence that the parties agreed to 
arbitration.   
 
All of this has to be decided before the arbitrator (or court) decides who decides the 
scope of arbitration, after which the arbitrator (or court) still must decide the merits of the 
dispute.  The complexity and ambiguity of First Options has had consequences.  It has 
already been cited sixteen times in Supreme Court cases alone,
77
 including four in which 
                                                 
75 514 U.S. at 943-44. 
76 Id. at 944-44. 
77 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 537 U.S. 79 (2002); Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 
561 U.S. 63 (2010); Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287 (2010); BG Group 
PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 559 
U.S. 662 (2010); Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003); Oxford Health Plans LLC v. 
Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013); Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000); Ornelas v. 
U.S., 517 U.S. 690 (1996); Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624 (2009); Hall Street Associates, 
LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008); Air Line Pilots Association v. Miller, 523 U.S. 866 (1998); 
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it was distinguished,
78
 six in which it was cited to different purposes in different opinions 
(dissenting or concurring),
79
 and twice in which it was cited by the dissent only.
80
  Only a 
lawyer – indeed, only a litigator could love – or even like – the doctrinal complexity 
spawned by First Options.  In sum, complex procedural standards are part of Chief 
Justice Roberts’s personal experience as a Supreme Court litigator.   This background 
may help explain why the Roberts Court’s decisions have been marked by a distinct 
revival of cases in civil procedure, which in turn may help explain its securities law 
decisions. 
 
B. The Procedural Revolution in the Roberts Court 
 
As noted by Wasserman, the Roberts Court has “heard and decided more than twenty 
cases in core civil procedure areas, including pleading, summary judgment, ... 
jurisdiction, ... removal procedure, class actions, civil representation, arbitration..., 
appeal[s], remedies, and Erie/Hanna.”81  This turn towards procedure is all the more 
striking because of how little time the Court had spent on procedure under prior Chief 
Justices.  “Souter joined the Court in the fall of 1990 ... and served for nineteen years, but 
never decided a personal jurisdiction case, despite ... explicit requests from lower-court 
judges for the Supreme Court to [resolve] lingering questions.”82 
 
More controversially, the Roberts Court has been using procedure to cut back on 
civil litigation against business defendants, deploying a range of loosely phrase standards.  
These cases include decisions on jurisdiction, pleading, class action requirements, and 
enforcement of arbitration contracts.  As Burbank testified to Congress, these decisions 
appear likely to “contribute to the phenomenon of vanishing trials, the degradation of the 
Seventh Amendment right to jury trial, and the emasculation of private civil litigation as 
a means of enforcing public law,” all done in the guise of interpretation, hence evading 
the Congressional review that accompanies open changes to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.
83
 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
Pacesetter Construction Co., Inc. v. Carpenters 46 Northern California Counties Conference Board, 516 
U.S. 802 (1995); Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277 (1995).   
78
 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 537 U.S. 79 (2002); Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 
561 U.S. 63 (2010); Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287 (2010); BG Group 
PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014). 
79 Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010); Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287 (2010); BG Group PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014); Stolt-
Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010); Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 
U.S. 444 (2003); Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013). 
80 Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000); Ornelas v. U.S., 517 U.S. 690 (1996). 
81
 Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedural Revival, 31 Rev. of Lit. 313, 
314 (2012) (citations omitted).   
82 Id. at 317. 
83
 Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts? Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. app. B (2009) (testimony of Stephen B. Burbank, Professor, U. Penn. Law School), 
available at http://1.usa.gov/Wkx4Fw (last visited July 18, 2014); see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (Rules 
Enabling Act governing explicit rule changes). 
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In Goodyear
84
 and McIntyre Machine,
85 
the Court held that state courts lack general 
jurisdiction over corporate defendants merely because their products reached the state 
through “stream of commerce,” even if they sell throughout the US through a local (but 
out of state) distributor, while leaving open precisely what “plus” factor needs to be 
shown to establish jurisdiction.  In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
86
 and Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal,
87
 the Court “case aside a fifty-year-old precedent”88 to held that in all civil cases, 
to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must be “plausible on its face,” and not 
merely “possible” or “consistent” with defendant liability, inviting judges to play a new 
and more aggressive role in bringing their “common sense” to bear at the motion to 
dismiss stage, prior to discovery, in evaluating the plausibility of a complaint.
89
  The 
Court articulated expressly the goals of “checking discovery abuse.”90  In Wal-Mart, the 
Court held that a class did not satisfy the “commonality” requirement if damages would 
differ across plaintiffs, even if other elements of the plaintiffs’ claims were identical.91  In 
Comcast, the Court held that plaintiffs seeking class certification must “ ‘affirmatively 
demonstrate’ ” certification requirements like the predominance of common questions.92   
 
Under all of these loosely phrased standards, judges can (on a case by case basis) 
dismiss cases early, increasing costs of successful litigation on plaintiffs, while 
potentially reducing the costs of litigation to defendants, and reducing the incidence of 
litigation.  In other words, the Roberts Court has been – outside the securities context – 
using procedural standards to reduce litigation, piecemeal, in a way that will be hard to 
observe, except in the aggregate, over time.
93
  This is the approach of an appellate 
litigator to a perceived problem of excessive litigation against business. 
 
The Court has departed from the use of loosely phrased standards in one area of its 
procedurally oriented, pro-business decisions:  enforcing arbitration clauses.  In Rent-a-
Center, the Court held enforceability of agreements could be made subject to 
arbitration;
94
 in Animalfeeds, the Court held that arbitrators may not impose class-wide 
remedies unless the arbitration clause explicitly provides for class arbitration;
95
 and in 
AT&T Mobility, the Court held that California’s common law rule making class-action 
waivers in arbitration agreements unenforceable as unconscionable was preempted by the 
Federal Arbitration Act;
96
 and in American Express,
97
 the Court extended AT&T Mobility 
                                                 
84
 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846 (2011). 
85
 J. Mcintyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
86
 Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545-46 (2007). 
87
 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
88 John F. Savarese, George T. Conway III, David B. Anders and Adir Waldman, Supreme Court Abandons 
Long-Standing Precedent on Pleading Standards, Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz Client Memo (May 22, 2007) (on file 
with author). 
89
 For a powerful empirical critique of judicial “common sense,” see Dan M. Kahan, David A. 
Hoffman, Donald Braman, Danieli Evans and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, “They Saw a Protest”:  Cognitive 
Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 851 (2012). 
90 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 560. 
91
 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011). 
92
 Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1426, 1432, 185 L.Ed.2d 515 (2013). 
93
 Wasserman, supra note 81 at 319. 
94
 Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010). 
95
 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010). 
96
 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011). 
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to hold that class-action bans in arbitration contracts were legal “even if they left citizens 
with no resource at all.”98  Together, even more than the standard-based decisions, these 
sharp-edged rule-like decisions provide large companies with incentives to use arbitration 
clauses in form consumer contracts to greatly curtail if not eliminate the risks of class 
actions arising out of the consumer transactions governed by the contracts.  The sweep of 
these cases is stunning.  As Kagan put it in dissent in American Express, “Amex has 
insulated itself from antitrust liability—even if it has in fact violated the law.”99 
 
Overall, procedure scholars from all sides of the political spectrum have agreed that 
the Roberts Court has in its procedural decisions exhibited a pro-business bent, consistent 
with a political (attitudinal) model.  “The analysis ... has been favorable to, and 
applauded by, repeat-player defendants in modern litigation seeking relief from the 
burdens of litigation, discovery, and liability—namely business and government 
defendants.” 100   While Wasserman argues that a simple pro-business/anti-plaintiff 
attitudinal model does not explain all of the Roberts Courts’ procedure cases, noting that 
Twombly was unanimous, he concedes that political ideology “does reveal itself in the 
most fundamental procedure cases, those touching on core issues at the heart of civil 
litigation and reflecting foundational divides about the purpose and operation of the civil 
justice system.”  As he notes, the Roberts Court has split 5-4 (on partisan lines) in its 
arbitration, class action, civil remedies and pleading cases – i.e., those decisions “directly 
and bluntly limiting plaintiffs’ access to court ...”101 At least some of these decisions have 
had discernible real-world effects.  Motions to dismiss have been filed more frequently 
post-Iqbal,
102
 and have been granted more frequently,
103
 particularly in civil rights and 
employment discrimination cases,
104
 with more modest effects in disability cases.
105
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C. Other Possible Cases at Intersection of Civil Procedure and Securities Law 
 
This review of the procedural revolution in the Roberts Court helps illuminate its 
securities law decisions.  As shown in Parts I and II, the Roberts Court has not been 
generally restrictive in its approach to securities law.  Instead, it tended to be restrictive 
when they involve procedure, and when a restrictive approach is more commensurate 
with a standard than with a bright-line rule.  As just shown above, both of those features 
are shared with the outcomes of the Court’s decisions more generally.   In other words, its 
restrictive securities law decisions are perhaps best understood as part of a broader 
retrenchment on procedure that has the effect of constraining federal court litigation in 
favor of business, even as it has a rejected bright-lines rules of substantive law that might 
have benefited managerial interests even more.  This combination of proceduralism and a 
preference for standards over rules lines up with the background of the Chief Justice as 
an appellate litigator, who are trained to shape arguments that focus on specific case 
facts, to not try to cabin judicial discretion in future cases with strongly worded 
interpretations of statutes, to argue for (or at least not argue against) interpretations and 
case law developments that incorporate complexity and ambiguity and hence generate 
future litigation.   
 
This analysis suggests that the Supreme Court is likely to grant certiorari and 
overturn lower courts in future securities law cases not simply where they have favored 
shareholders over managers, or encouraged more litigation, but instead they have applied 
bright-line rules, as in Jones, Matrixx and Credit Suisse, or where the issues concern 
procedural components of the securities litigation process, as in Halliburton II.  By 
contrast, in substantive securities law cases, where no bright-line rule was used in the 
lower courts, the Court will have the same marginal and lottery-like effects that it S&T 
argued it was having under the post-Powell Rehnquist Court. 
 
This analysis and set of predictions is consistent with the two grants of certiorari the 
Court has issued in securities law cases for the October 2014 term, IndyMac MBS
106
 and 
Omnicare.
107
  Both involve procedure and hence are more likely to produce restrictive 
outcomes.  IndyMac MBS presents two intertwined procedural issues:  whether the filing 
of a class action tolls the limitations period under the Securities of 1933.  The foregoing 
analysis suggests that the answer will be “not necessarily.”  Omnicare is another 
procedural issue, involving pleading standards:  whether a plaintiff under Section 11 of 
the Securities of 1933 must plead that a statement of opinion was subjectively disbelieved 
by the speaker, or whether it is enough to plead that the opinion was untrue.  Again, given 
                                                                                                                                                 
Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 Ky. L.J. 235, 241, 254-55 (2012); cf. Joseph A. Seiner, The 
Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 Ill. L. 
Rev. 1011 (finding non-statistically significant increase in employment discrimination cases) post-
Twombly) 
105
 Joseph A. Seiner, Pleading Disability, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 95, 95-99 (2010). Title I of the ADA 
prohibits an employer with fifteen or more employees from discriminating against a qualified individual on 
the basis of disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2006). 
106 No. 13-640. 
107 No. 13-435. 
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its procedural component, the analysis of the article suggests that the answer will be that 
plaintiffs must plead the opinion was subjectively disbelieved.  Beyond the October 2014 
term, the issues generated or left open by recent securities law cases, and hence likely to 
generate litigation in the lower courts, are how to determine whether a fund fee is 
excessive under Section 36(b), how to apply the “price impact” defense to class 
certification, and what kinds of discovery will be permitted prior to class certification, in 
order to permit the parties to join the issues that Halliburton II will permit defendants to 
raise.  Given the ongoing mass of securities litigation, particularly in the context of 
mergers and acquisitions, lower courts can also be expected to attempt to use bright-line 
to manage their dockets and knock out whole classes of cases.  Certiorari will not be 
granted in all such cases, but when it is, we can expect the Roberts Court to refuse to 
accept such methods of shutting the courthouse door.   
 
The one exception is likely to track that in procedure more generally – arbitration – 
where the Court has been exceedingly deferential to the arbitration to reduce litigation.  
That might suggest that the various kinds of arbitration bylaws being disputed recently
108
 
will fare well in the Supreme Court, but First Options suggests that the outcome will be 
more unpredictable than a simple pro-business assumed ideology for the Court would 
predict, precisely because such bylaws implicate one of the many complex steps in the 
First Options doctrine – did the parties actually consent to arbitration?  Can shareholders 
be presumed to have consented to them if they buy stock after they are adopted?  If not, 
might they be valid as against some shareholders but not those who purchased before 
they were adopted?  Does the fact that such a bylaw was adopted pursuant to a disclosed 
process of board adoption, pursuant to authority granted in the company’s charter or 
default law, create enough of an indirect form of consent to satisfy First Options and 
progeny?  The smart money will be that whatever the answers to those questions under 
the Roberts Court, they will be complex, hard-to-predict, and generate yet more litigation 
in the future.   
 
One last implication of this article’s analysis is that the Court may be most likely to 
take up securities law cases where they intersect with the “procedural revolution” 
reviewed above, or in other “growth areas” of doctrine, such as the ever-expanding 
modern “commercial speech” component of the First Amendment.  But in those areas, 
precisely because securities law cases are part of a broader shift, and not the focus of the 
court’s attention per se, the results are likely to be somewhat lottery-like, hard to predict 
on the merits, and have unsystematic effects.  Where the Court may be expected to matter 
more systematically to financial regulatory law (including securities law), is when it 
decides to respond to the increasingly polarized D.C. Circuit in its oversight of the federal 
regulatory agencies, including the SEC.
109
  In that setting, the Republican members of the 
                                                 
108  E.g., Galaviz v. Berg, D.Ct. N. D. Cal. No. C 10-4233 RS (Jan. 3, 2011), available at 
http://www.wsgr.com/PDFSearch/oracle0111.pdf (last visited July 20, 2014); Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. 
Chevron Corp. (Del. Ch. June 25, 2013); Groen v. Safeway Inc., No. RG 14716641 (Superior Court of Cal. May 14, 
2014), available at http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/files/2014/06/safeway-MTDopinion.pdf (last visited July 14, 
2014). 
109 See John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation:  Case Studies and Implications, Yale 
L.J. (forthcoming 2014); John C. Coates IV, Towards Better Cost-Benefit Analysis:  An Essay On Regulatory 
Management, L. & Contemp. Probs. (forthcoming 2014). 
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Court will be torn between two ideological imperatives:
110
  to favor business, by 
upholding an activist lower court, or to maintain a commitment to judicial modesty in 
reviewing regulatory agency decisions, as reflected in decisions such as Chevron
111
 or 
Baltimore Gas.
112
  It has a pair of related cases in the October 2014 term, involving the 
degree of process required under the Administrative Procedure Act before an agency can 
change non-binding interpretive rules, that may indicate which way the administrative 
law is blowing.
113
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has shown that, quantitatively, the Roberts Court’s securities law 
jurisprudence does not mark a significant departure from prior Supreme Courts.  While 
the share of securities law cases has increased, that is because it has kept the number of 
securities law cases constant, while shrinking its overall docket.  The decisions have not 
been marked by polarization and dissent – if anything the trend is towards more 
unanimity.  Nor has the Court been generally restrictive of shareholder rights.  A 
qualitative review of the fifteen decisions bears out this analysis, but also suggests two 
ways to understand the outcomes:  the Court has been most restrictive where the cases 
have involved procedural issues, and it has consistently rejected bright-line rules 
articulated by lower courts to restrict shareholder rights.  Those factors do at least as well, 
and (given the limits of a small sample) perhaps better in rationalizing outcomes than a 
simple attitudinal model.  Those factors also line up with the Court’s broader 
retrenchment through procedure on litigation against business generally, as well as with 
the Chief Justice’s background as an appellate litigator.  If this analysis is correct, we 
should expect to see a continued low level of securities law cases, most commonly 
occurring where they intersect with procedure, or perhaps the Court’s growing interest in 
an active “commercial speech” doctrine under the First Amendment, or perhaps where 
the increasingly polarized D.C. Circuit has been using both the First Amendment and 
administrative law principles to intervene actively in striking down SEC regulations.  
What we are likely not to see are sweeping bright-line rules, or wholesale reversals of 
existing doctrines, such as the judicial elimination of Rule 10b-5 litigation.  Instead, the 
Roberts Court’s securities law decisions to date promise just the opposite:  continued use 
of standards, common-law evolution, and increasing doctrinal complexity.   
 
  
                                                 
110 For a discussion of the broader issues at stake, see Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian 
Administrative Law, Working Paper (June 29, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2460822 (last visited July 1, 
2014). 
111 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
112 Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983) (“a reviewing court must generally be at its 
most deferential” when examining scientific determinations). 
113 Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association, No. 13-1041 and Nickols v. Mortgage Bankers Association, No. 13-
1052. 
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Appendix A – Securities Cases in the Roberts Court Through July 15, 2014 
      
Case Term Expansive? Procedural? Vote Roberts Vote 
Expansive? 
      
Tellabs 2006 No No 8-1 No 
Stoneridge 2007 No No 5-3 No 
Jones 2009 Yes No 9-0 Yes 
Merck 2009 Yes Yes 9-0 Yes 
Morrison 2009 No Yes 8-0 No 
PCAOB 2010 Neutral No 5-4 N/A 
Matrixx 2010 Yes No 9-0 Yes 
Janus 2010 No No 5-4 No 
Halliburton I 2010 Yes Yes 9-0 Yes 
Credit Suisse 2011 No Yes 8-0 No 
Gabelli 2012 No Yes 9-0 No 
Amgen 2012 Yes Yes 6-3 Yes 
Troice 2013 Yes Yes 7-2 Yes 
Lawson 2013 Yes No 6-3 Yes 
Halliburton II 2013 No Yes 9-0 No 
     
% Expansive  50% (7 of 14) 53% (8 of 15)  50% (7 of 14) 
Dissents/Votes    15%  
5 Vote Decisions    3 (20%)  
Unanimous Votes    8 (53%)  
 
 
